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Abstract. Where do perceptually grounded categories come from? Some resear-
chers claim they are innate, others claim they are learned. This paper presents a
third 'ecological' approach. I propose a system by which discrimination networks,
capable of categorial distinctions, spontaneously grow, rather independently of
specific examples. I show that linguistic interaction can drive a spiraling increase
in the ontological complexity of an agent. The ontology formation mechanism
can be coupled to adaptive language games by which a shared lexicon sponta-
neously self-organises. Software simulations and experiments with robotic agents
serve as examples.
1 Introduction
The past few years, a number of researchers have become interested in building operational
theories for how language and the conceptualisation of reality that underlies language can
bootstrap itself, both in a developing single individual (ontogenesis) and in the human
species (glossogenesis); (Hurford, 1989), (Steels, 1979b), (Kirby, 1999). An operational
theory is one that is sufficiently worked out and formalised that it can be tested by computer
simulations and robotic experiments. Whether such a theory is also valid for humans
remains an open question, but at least the theory is operationally adequate and therefore
suggests interesting hypotheses for psychologists, linguists, and neurophysiologists on
how things might be.
The ultimate test of an operational theory consists in creating a set of artificial agents
with a specific architecture and grounded through a sensori-motor apparatus in the world,
and in demonstrating that these agents are autonomously capable to bootstrap their own
language and their own ontologies without any human intervention. When the agents are in
contact with human language behavior, they should be influenced up to a point where they
adopt an existing language and its underlying ontology. This is a formidable challenge
because it requires not only a system capable to engage in linguistic interaction about scenes
perceived through its senses, but also in mechanisms capable to acquire perceptually groun-
ded concepts, a lexicon, and a grammar, and participate in their collective construction.
2 The Talking Heads Experiment
We have been working in this direction and have reached already some important mile-
stones, particularly in the area of lexical semantics (Steels, 1996a; 1996b; 1997a). These
results have been integrated in the Talking Heads experiment1, a large-scale public experi-
ment in which visually grounded and situated robotic agents autonomously develop a shared
lexicon and ontology from scratch (Steels and Kaplan, 1999b). The agents use vision to
make contact with the world. There are different physical installations (Paris, Tokyo, etc.)
connected through the Internet, and agents can teleport from one robot body to another thus
experiencing different realities. The agents can also interact with humans so that their evolv-
ing languages are influenced by human communication.
1http://talking-heads.csl.sony.fr
2Inspired by a Wittgensteinian view, the interaction between the agents consists of a
language game, called the guessing game. One agent plays the role of speaker and the other
one then plays the role of hearer. Agents take turns playing games so all of them develop the
capacity to be speaker or hearer. Agents are capable of segmenting the image perceived
through the camera into objects and of collecting various sensory data about each object,
such as the color (decomposed in RGB channels), average gray-scale or position. The set of
objects and their data constitute a context. The speaker chooses one object from this context,
further called the topic. The other objects form the background. The speaker then gives a
linguistic hint to the hearer.
The linguistic hint is an utterance that identifies the topic with respect to the objects in
the background. For example, if the context contains [1] a red square, [2] a blue triangle,
and [3] a green circle, then the speaker may say something like "the red one" to commu-
nicate that [1] is the topic. If the context contains also a red triangle, he has to be more
precise and say something like "the red square". Of course, the Talking Heads do not say
"the red square" but use their own language and concepts which are never going to be the
same as those used in English. For example, they may say "malewina" to mean [UPPER
EXTREME-LEFT LOW-REDNESS].
Based on the linguistic hint, the hearer tries to guess what topic the speaker has chosen,
and he communicates his choice to the speaker by pointing to the object. A robot points by
transmitting in which direction he is looking. The game succeeds if the topic guessed by the
hearer is equal to the topic chosen by the speaker. The game fails if the guess was wrong or
if the speaker or the hearer failed at some earlier point in the game. In case of a failure, the
speaker gives an extra-linguistic hint by pointing to the topic he had in mind, and both
agents try to repair their internal structures to be more successful in future games.
The architecture of the agents has two components: a conceptualisation module re-
sponsible for categorising reality or for applying categories to find back the referent in the
perceptual image, and a verbalisation module responsible for verbalising a conceptualisation
or for interpreting a form to reconstruct its meaning. Agents start with no prior designer-
supplied ontology nor lexicon. A shared ontology and lexicon must emerge from scratch in
a self-organised process. The agents therefore not only play the game but also expand or
adapt their ontology or lexicon to be more successful in future games.
The languages emerging from these experiments can be called proto-languages (in the
sense of Bickerton (1995)). This means that they consist of single or multi-word phrases
without any grammar. At the moment research is progressing to study the emergence of
grammar, which is attempted by (1) introducing a productive way to generate more complex
semantic structures, and (2) introducing the ability to recognise and produce hierarchical
structures (Steels, 1998).
3 Underlying hypotheses
Our first main strategic goal has been to solve the problem at all without any theoretical
preconceptions, in other words to find an agent architecture and modes of interaction that
would exhibit the desired bootstrapping of cognitive and linguistic capabilities. We have
tried many 'classical' solutions on the way, such as induction of perceptually grounded con-
cepts through neural networks, language learning by abstraction from examples, designer-
supplied perceptually grounded categories (as would be the case if they were innate),
incorporation of an innate universal grammar, etc. These solutions could not be made to
work for various reasons and had to be rejected in favor of rather radical alternatives.
The main insights so far can be summarised as follows:
1. Selectionism. We do not adopt an instructionist approach, in which language and
meaning are assumed to be learned by progressive abstraction from a series of examples,
neither a nativist approach, where language and meaning is assumed to be largely innate.
Instead we provide agents with mechanisms for growing in a partly random fashion new
internal structures (for perception, categorisation, lexicalisation, syntactic structuring) which
internally compete to participate in a particular game. Feedback then propagates about the
3success of these structures in the game, and this feedback is used to determine which struc-
tures will be retained and which ones are pruned. This selectionist process assumes massive
parallelism both in the operation of the cognitive system and in the search towards viable
solutions. There is a structural coupling between the different cognitive layers so that they
become coordinated without a central coordinator.
2. Self-organisation. Language should be viewed as a complex adaptive system. Self-
organisation (as opposed to innateness) plays a key role in achieving coherence and general
cognitive and sensori-motor constraints as well as constraints on the physics of our natural
world help to explain the universal tendencies observed in human languages. Linguistic self-
organisation is achieved when a positive feedback loop is established between use and suc-
cess in use, so that some conventions flourish and others are overtaken. Various selectionist
pressures help to decide which structures survive: efficiency in memory use and processing,
learnability, and historical spread. The complex dynamics viewpoint introduces new ways
to study language contact (Steels and McIntyre, 1999) as well as language evolution (Steels
and Kaplan, 1998) and is completely complementary to the study of the competence and
operation of an individual speaker/hearer.
3. Situatedness. Meaning arises in the individual through strongly situated and embod-
ied interactions, as opposed to being given in a clear a priori. It is subjective in the sense of
not necessarily shared even by members of the same language community. Individual
meaning is structurally coupled to the conceptualisations of other agents through language.
Language and meaning co-evolve and their joint simultaneous bootstrapping strongly
influence both.
4 Conclusions
Research on operational theories for the origins of language turn out to be a gold mine for
discovering and testing new ideas related to the acquisition and collective construction of
meaning, lexicon and grammar. Although we are still in the early phases of this kind of
research, already some intriguing novel hypotheses have come forward, which are offered
to the cognitive science community for critical examination and empirical testing.
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